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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS

Asbestos-containing buildings are significantly more hazardous to our
economy than they are to our health.

California building owners, including

state government, will spend at least $1 billion this year to eliminate
asbestos from their properties.

•

Long range expenditures could exceed $20

billion, including $1.3 billion for state buildings and $1 billion for
schools.

But medical researchers consider nonoccupational exposure to

asbestos in buildings to be a very minimal health risk.

In fact, one study

estimates that overall removal efforts cost $10 million-per-life saved.
The impetus behind asbestos abatement work in schools and state
buildings is protection of health.

But the driving force behind removal in

the commercial marketplace is liability fears and uncertainties over future
abatement costs which serve to devalue buildings as much as 25 percent.
Lenders do not want to finance the purchase of a building with asbestos
liabilities, consequently, the material is removed so that the building can
again be "marketable".
Efforts to eliminate asbestos from our indoor environment are straining
an already weak regulatory program which is ineffective in preventing
unsafe removal jobs.

Over 70 percent of the abatement work in California

is not physically inspected by a regulatory agency.
every job.

Other states inspect

Improper asbestos removal practices can endanger workers and,

under certain conditions, building occupants.

i

Although current research minimizes health risks posed by undi
asbestos materials, health problems can occur when these materials
microscopic asbestos fibers into breathing areas.

ease

Conditions whi

individually or collectively trigger releases include fire and water
damage, vandalism, material aging, maintenance and remodeling work, air
flows and foot traffic.

It is technologically difficult to know when or

how much asbestos has been released.

The degree of harm posed by episodic,

nonoccupational exposure has not been medically documented.
Removal is too often the only option considered by building owners.
Preventing exposure to asbestos should be a management function which
matches building use and the material's condition with a wide variety of
control responses.

A sound management plan can include conducting general

maintenance checks of asbestos materials; repairing damaged spots when
feasible; encapsulating material with a sealant; constructing a barrier
prevent release into other building areas; closing the contaminated area
down to building use or, as the last resort, complete removal.

These

options may range in cost from a few cents per-square-foot to $30
per-square-foot.

When removal is tied in with renovation work, there is a

significant cost savings over removal work that is conducted 'prematurel
1

i.e., prior to scheduled renovation work.
Assessing the potential for fiber releases and developing plans
control these releases is a professional skill that is in great
in short supply.
consultants".

t

Other states regulate individuals who work as "asbestos

Except for federal regulations which require asbestos

consultants to be EPA-approved to work in schools, there are no regulations
for asbestos consultants in California.

ii

Anyone may do the work.

It is assumed that workers, such as maintenance personnel, who come in
frequent contact with asbestos materials are at risk if they disturb
asbestos materials in a way which releases fibers.

Training and labeling

of asbestos materials are deemed important safeguards to preventing
exposure.
Our public and private schools (K-12) are in the greatest jeopardy due
to new federal mandates which put them on an unrealistic deadline for
instituting comprehensive asbestos management controls.

•

A new EPA

regulation, effective December 14, 1987, requires California's 15,000
public and private schools to develop intricate plans for managing asbestos
by October 12, 1988.

Schools must begin removing, encapsulating or in some

way controlling asbestos materials by July 9, 1989.
technical assistance,

Without funding and

some schools may be victimized by inexperienced

inspectors, planners and abatement contractors.

The state must play an

active, aggressive role in helping schools comply with the EPA regulation
which empowers the Governor to intercede when schools fail to implement
asbestos management programs.
The state, itself, needs to improve management of asbestos in its
buildings.

There is limited training for maintenance workers, no labeling

of asbestos materials and no consistent policies for informing state
employees about asbestos hazards and removal work.

Furthermore, the state

has employed contractors who were not legally registered to do asbestos
work and has demonstrated an inability to understand its own asbestos laws
and regulations.
Clearly, the state's highest priority is to quickly improve regulation
of asbestos abatement activities to insure that public health and taxpayer
dollars will not be endangered by unnecessary expenditures for work that is
performed unsafely.
iii

Major Recommendations

1.

Strengthen our regulatory network before, or in conjunction wi
developing programs and regulations that could increase the amount of
asbestos abatement work now underway in California.

(Specific

legislative proposals are on page 45).
2.

Reorganize the state's program to control asbestos in its buildi
Centralize enforcement powers in one state agency.

s.

Lessen dependency

on vendors--develop in-house expertise in hazard assessment.
authority to cover schools as well as state buildings.

Expand

Use control

language in the state budget to insure that asbestos expenditures will
be spent wisely and safely.

(Specific legislative proposals on

page 82).
3.

Provide immediate technical assistance to public and private schools
attempting to comply with the EPA asbestos regulations and appropri
$40 million to public schools to help them meet the inspection

management plan requirements.

(Specific legislative proposals on

page 65).

iv

CHAPTER I
THE UNWINNABLE WAR

In the Year 2001, a workman emerges from a cocoon-like structure inside
the lobby of a large office building.

He raises a plastic bag over his

head and yells into the glare of television cameras:

"This is it -- the

last bag of asbestos in America ...
While the "1 ast bag" is fantasy at this point in time, the current war
effort to remove asbestos-containing materials from our indoor environment,
is anything but imagined. In 1988, building owners will spend over
$1 billion 1 for the right to say their California properties are
"asbestos-free." The battlelines will widen over the next three years.
More removal.

More expenditures.

More mistakes.

Yes, there will be

hundreds of unreported cases of asbestos being removed improperly from
buildings, acts which subject unsuspecting workers and building occupants
to the risk of inhaling cancer-causing asbestos fibers.
While heated debate over the dangers posed by asbestos in buildings is
far from complete, the potential of asbestos as an economic burden is not
questioned.

Abatement experts claim $100 billion to $200 billion could be

spent over the next 25 years for the removal of asbestos materials from our
nation•s buildings.

It is becoming commonplace for the cost of asbestos

removal to be a discount factor during commercial real estate negotiations.
Pension adviser John McMahan calls asbestos
facing U.S. real estate today."

-1-

11

the biggest single problem

Asbestos is already helping to bankrupt school districts.

The U.S

Environmental Protection Agency estimates the cost of abating asbes
hazards in our nation's schools at $3.2 billion.
school clean-up could exceed $1 billion.

California 1 s

But the documentation

problems in California schools is so unreliable that it may be
estimate how much it will cost to control asbestos exposure in our 15,
public and private schools.
Aside from schools, the number of buildings containing
materials is staggering.

A 1984 EPA study estimated 20 percent

buildings in this country had asbestos materials in potentially
condition.

Actual projections included 511,000 office buildi

apartment complexes and 14,000 federal buildings -- schools
local government structures were not included in the study.

is

expected to release an updated building survey in early 1988.
Mount Sinai School of Medicine researchers believe asbestos can
found in most buildings constructed between 1950 and 1970.
experts contend that 60 percent of the commercial buildi

s in

i

contain asbestos.
The Consumer Product Safety Commission has been

e to

many homes have asbestos materials.

Controversial Health Risks
Asbestos removal work is booming despite the fact that

cal

has yet to provide a strong link between the occupational
conditions which have killed thousands of asbestos workers and
nonoccupational exposure risks inherent with living and working in a
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a

building with asbestos materials.

While asbestos' economic impact can be

measured on a balance sheet, tracking its impact on the health of building
occupants hinges on factors which researchers find difficult to quantify.
This risk dilemma was expertly defined by Los Angeles Times reporter Barry
Siegel in a front page article, "Managing Risks:

Sense and Science"

(7/5/87):

"Many laws presume the possibility of zero risk and
assign liability where that is not reached. But
science's increasingly sophisticated ability to detect
and finely measure dangers renders the world a mine
field of risks, many unavoidable. Science cannot
provide the certainty of protection demanded by the
statues."

I

Asbestos is a classic case of science's inability to deliver the
assurances of "zero risk" to policymakers.

Consider that the EPA is the

most vocal proponent of the "no threshold theory", or belief that there is
no safe level of exposure to asbestos; i.e., technically, one fiber could
kill.

Also consider that recent technological advances have enabled

industrial hygienists to detect minute levels of asbestos in buildings that
only a few years ago would have escaped notice.

Therefore, the "no

threshold theory" coupled with new air monitoring capabilities have opened
the door to what many perceive as a highly emotional, almost panicked,
thinking that permeates asbestos policymaking.
California's Official Rock
There are several eye-opening asbestos facts that are generally omitted
from policy dialogue.

For one, researchers have found that most people in

this country have asbestos fibers in their lungs.

Like it or not, we live

with asbestos, a commercial term for the well-developed and hairlike

-3-

long-fibered varieties of certain minerals that satisfy particular
industrial needs.

And we have a great deal of naturally occurring asbestos

exposure in California.

In fact, our official state rock is

11

Serpentine 11 ,

a mineral group which produces chrysotile, the most commonly used
asbestos today.

Currently the EPA is keeping a close watch on Coalinga

which is near an area containing the largest serpentine deposit in North
America.

Two abandoned mines near Coalinga are on the EPA's Nati

Priorities List which identifies serious hazardous waste sites for
The EPA contends that recent studies indicate that the erosion of
serpentine deposits could adversely impact air and water quality.
exposure a1so occurs "natura lly 11 in the Bay Area where serpentine deposits
line the hills above Berkeley.
Asbestos, prized for its durability, resistance to heat and bondi
capabilities has found its way into a multitude of products, each servi
as a potential source of exposure.

Fibers released from automotive

are a prime contributor to asbestos levels in urban areas.

Until

1980's, hair dryers were a source of asbestos exposure.

this

focuses on the exposure from asbestos fibers released from

ildi

y

materials such as insulation around pipes, fireproofing on beams
acoustical material on ceilings and walls.

More than 30

llion

asbestos has found its way into our buildings during the 1
with the prime application years running from 1950-1970.
Twenty years ago it cost 25 cents per-square-foot to spray asbes

on

beams and ceilings; today building owners are paying $25 per-square-foot
have this same material removed.

The lethal legacy of this one-time

miracle mineral can spell financial doom for owners of high-rise buildings
laden with asbestos.
-4-

This report acknowledges that a $200 billion war is not winnable.
task at hand is to manage a potential hazard.

The

Controlling exposure

conditions is a significantly different function than establishing
unrealistic timetables for the total elimination of asbestos materials in
buildings.
If asbestos is the enemy, then we need to do a better job understanding
it.

-5-

FOOTNOTES
Chapter 1

1.

AOR independently conferred with four asbestos abatement
agreed that $1 billion was a reasonable estimate when
such as employee relocation and lost rental income due to
il
closure during removal were included in the building owner's
abatement bill. Using EPA and Cal-OSHA records for reported
work, we estimated about 5,500 jobs will be performed in
average costs of $200,000. We found removal costs
square foot up to $89 per square foot. Long-term proj
estimates provided by industry analysts and hazard
consultants.
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CHAPTER II
UNCERTAIN HEALTH RISKS

Asbestos-containing materials in buildings are hazards much like rocks
are on a mountain.

Under certain conditions these materials can release

asbestos fibers just as rocks sometimes roll.

But, for the most part,

asbestos and rocks are static and, consequently, pose no threat to human
health.
While no one argues against efforts to prevent rockslides, considerable
controversy surrounds public policies aimed at controlling release of
asbestos fibers in buildings, particularly in schools.
Without question, asbestos can kill.

The sustained inhalation of

asbestos fibers has been extensively documented as a cause of premature
death among insulation and textile workers.

But the notion that people can

die simply from breathing asbestos fibers that escape from aging
construction materials in buildings has not been substantiated through
autopsies.

Some critics, however, contend that by regulating asbestos

materials in buildings, lawmaking agencies are institutionalizing the fear
that building occupants will suffer the same consequences as WWII shipyard
workers, who were often enveloped in asbestos dust.

The critics say an

unbridled asbestos panic promotes policies that are tantamount to removing
all the rocks from a mountain, not just the ones likely to slide.
Since there are no medical reports of people dying strictly from
low-level exposure to asbestos in buildings, researchers estimates of death
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rates for occupants in buildings with asbestos are based on mortali
for occupations which involved sustained exposure to asbestos fibers

The

projections assume risks are directly proportional to the 1
exposure.

Researchers concede that the geometric descent

asbestos levels to low building levels subjects findings to
uncertainty."

e

i

Insulation workers who died from asbestos-related diseases

were often inhaling fiber concentrations 10,000 to 100,000
than levels typically found in an asbestos-containing buildi
general disclaimer is "more research needed. 11
But researchers avoid endorsing an exposure threshold, or a
which the amount of asbestos fibers in the air is no longer a threat to
health.

"There is no known safe level of exposure to asbestos" is a

popular phrase appearing in government documents.

Technically,

believes that one fiber could trigger death, but the EPA also
asbestos materials in good condition, left undisturbed,

a

negligible risk to health. 1
The no safe level or 11 one fiber could kill" theory is
behind the argument that asbestos materials in buildings are

a

potential health risk.
The EPA is now telling school administrators that a new

1

regulation (December 1987) for schools will help officials
asbestos should be removed -- it is no longer a

on

simply wants the "bad rocks" out first with all other "
when appropriate.
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Asbestos-Related Diseases
There are three major asbestos-related diseases: asbes
and lung cancer.

, mesothelioma

The latency period can be as long as 40 years.

Asbestosis is caused exclusively by exposure to asbestos fibers and
results in chronic, restrictive lung disease.

The absence of recorded

cases of asbestosis caused by low-level nonoccupational exposure and the
fact that asbestosis is a progressive generalized condition would be
consistent with a threshold below which fibrosis may not occur.

In short,

nonoccupational exposure studies do not include asbestosis.
Mesothelioma is a rare cancer of membrane cells lining the lung and
abdomen and is usually fatal within a year of diagnosis.

lung Cancer is caused by many factors, especially smoking.

Asbestos

fibers significantly increase the risk of contracting lung cancer.
Mesothelioma and lung cancer are the asbestos-related diseases of
concern to researchers studying nonoccupational exposure risks.

There is

debate over the degree of risk posed by various types of "asbestos." There
is some thought that chrysoltile, which accounts for 90 percent of the
asbestos used today, may not be as health threatening as other commercially
used fibrous asbestos types such as tremolite, amosite, anthrophyllite,
actinolite and crocidolite.

But, again, the "uncertain" label prevents

researchers from unanimously declaring that one type of asbestos is safer
than another.

-9-

Measuring Asbestos levels:
Surviving that uncertain statistical crossover
the nonoccupational exposure requires an understandi
employed in the measurement of asbestos fibers present in
space.

The process involves using a pump to draw air

a

then, using a microscope to count the fibers collected.
The fiber count definition is complicated by
fibers.

s

Some studies support the theory that thin, long fi

dangerous than short, thick fibers because they
less difficulty.

The Occupational Safety and Health

workplace standard only counts fibers of five microns in
length to width ratio of 3:1.
The fi

count is expressed in terms of the

given volume of air over a certain period
rul

that workers shall not be exposed to more

fibers (200 fibers fit on the head of a

n),

length, over an eight hour-time weighted average.
written as .2 fibers per cubic centimeter of air or

s
.2

Exposure levels in this report are recorded as
is assumed unless noted otherwise).
OSHA standard occupational readings are done
optical microscope which allows visualization of

a
als

are

Materials with a 3:1 aspect ratio, five microns or
recorded.
origin.

This method does not distinguish among
OSHA contends that a more accurate method is

-10-

i

workplace since it is safe to assume that fibers collected where asbestos
is handled are probably asbestos fibers.

More accurate measurement methods

require much more lab time (one day vs one week.) and cost more than the
optical method ($25 vs $250).
Transmission Electron Microscopy (TEM) is the recognized method for
measuring low concentration and smaller fibers of asbestos in buildings.
With TEM it is possible to distinguish between fiber types.
Insulation workers, who later became victims of asbestos-related
diseases, were often subjected to levels of asbestos fibers in the range of
five to 15 f/cc + 8 hr TWA.

In sharp contrast to these occupational

levels, building studies, using the TEM method, have reported levels of
asbestos to be as low as 0.009 f/cc (1983, EPA).

Surveys conducted in

Britain and Canada, rarely detected levels in excess of 0.001 f/cc.
In 1985, California required that school districts seeking aid for
asbestos removal, show need by proving that asbestos levels exceeded 0.01
f/cc.

As of October 9, 1987, not a single school seeking state funds to

abate indoor asbestos problems had surpassed the 0.01 level.

The 0.01

standard was modified September 30, 1987, by urgency legislation(Chapter
1254) to allow more schools to qualify for state funding. 2
Asbestos levels in our schools can be misleading in terms of a risk
analysis.

First, some researchers assign risk to low exposure levels, even

those below .01 f/cc.

Secondly, the record of no schools exceeding .01

f/cc is based on those schools applying for funds and does not take into
account schools which may have higher levels, but have not applied for
funds.

For example, in 1987, a San Jose area school had asbestos materials

-11-

spill into a library after a construction mishap.
according to school officials, was .018 f/cc.

The recorded 1

In this case the material

was cleaned up before consideration could be given to applying
aid.

Air Monitoring Controversy
as a means

Finally there is strong opposition to using air moni
of assessing potential asbestos risks.

use

The EPA does not

of air monitoring to assess the condition of asbestos materials prior to
abatement action.

The EPA contends that air monitoring is si

snapshot, not indicative of the ability of the materi
at any given point in time.

y a

to

The EPA recommends air monitori

during removal as well as after as a post-abatement clearance check.
Finally, on November 20, 1987, the State Department

Heal

ces

released (11 months late) a study, mandated by 1985 state legisl
1587), which stated that it is

11

not reasonable to require air moni

for deciding whether abatement is to be funded. 11
also concluded that abatement decisions

11

De

should be based

vi

inspection with bulk material analysis. 11
1 ze

The EPA's detractors advocate the use of air monitori
fears and decision making.

For example, at a U.S. Senate

n

Dr. John D. Spengler, Harvard University, testified, 11 TO date,

's

asbestos program has de-emphasized reliance on air measurements.

As a

result, there has been an irrational response of removing asbestos
schools and buildings based completely on its presence. 11
testimony has been echoed often since EPA issued its first
regulations for schools in 1982.
-12-

This
tos

The air monitoring controversy lingers on in the State Legislature
where two, two year bills (AB 1348, Floyd and SB 894, Marks) are attempting
to set conditions which would require a building owner to abate an asbestos
hazard.

In particular, the Floyd measure relies on visual assessment, not

air monitoring to define the hazard. Opponents of AB 1348 say they would
support the measure if abatement action were triggered by violation of a
numerical air standard.

The opponents argue that an air standard,

determined by air monitoring, would clearly define a building owner s
1

•

responsibility.

But supporters of visual assessment contend that a

numerical air standard would allow owners to claim their buildings were
"safe" if the established air level was not exceeded and that such a claim
contradicts the EPA's philosophy that there is no known "safe" level of
exposure to asbestos--even low level exposure
Risk Assessments:

More Dramatic Than Useful

Notwithstanding the imperfections of risk projections and weaknesses of
air monitoring, here are the most current risk projections for
nonoccupational mortality due to asbestos exposure in buildings:
(1)

The risk to students exposed to an average concentration of 0.001
f/cc for six years in a school is estimated at five excess
lifetime deaths (lung cancer and mesothelioma) per million
students exposed.

The number of deaths would triple if the level

of asbestos increased to 0.003 f/cc, or an annual average rate of
0.25 deaths per million.

By comparison this group would produce

32,000 lung cancer deaths not attributable to asbestos exposure.
The annual death rate per million in the United States is ten for
playing high school football and 14 for riding a bike (ages 10 to

-13-

14).

Since the EPA has stated that about three

llion

i

are exposed to friable asbestos materials in schools,
annual death rate of 0.25 per million would
0.75 annual deaths (Hughes and Wei11). 3
assume the mean fiber concentration in Uni
asbestos materials is 0.001 f/cc, a figure based on
by the Ontario Royal Commission.
(2)

If one million people were exposed to 0.001 f/cc in a
ten years, beginning at age 22, then by

i

me

deaths could be attributed to asbestos-rel

diseases.

commuter who drove five miles each way
building would be 20 times more likely to
seas e.

while commuting than to succumb from an
Based on the low risk presented by asbestos

s i

buildings, and the high cost of removal,
asbestos could very well cost over$
(Dewees). 4
(3)

1 ion

If a person inhaled air with an average 1
a

year-lifetime, then the lifetime

be nine in one million and lung cancer would
million for nonsmokers.

Cancer

men and 23 for women when the sample consi
(National Research Council). 5
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0.

On-The-Job Deaths

The "uncertainty" associated with building exposure dangers contrasts
sharply with the documentation of annual deaths attributed to occupational
asbestos exposure.

Current research indicates that prior exposure to

asbestos in the workplace will account for 2,000 mesothelioma and 4,000 to
6,000 annual lung cancer deaths.

Noted researcher, Doctor Irving J.

Selikoff, has estimated that industrial asbestos exposure has killed about

•

100,000 workers as of 1980.

A 1983 study projects that occupational

asbestos deaths in the United States will decrease to 1,500 annually by the
year 2000 (Hughes and Weill). 6
Asbestos fibers can remain airborne for 24 hours or more.

Their

ability to cling to objects was dramatically underscored by a 1981 study of
Los Angeles area shipyard workers which revealed that family members had a
much higher rate of radiologic signs of asbestos diseases than other
control groups.

In fact, 11.3 percent of the 274 shipyard worker•s wives

studied had asbestos problems, compared to no similar problems in a group
of women whose husbands did not handle asbestos.

The researchers concluded
that exposure resulted from workers bringing home fibers on their clothes. 7

Current OSHA practices call for special cleaning of clothes.

Many asbestos

workers wear disposable uniforms to avoid spreading fibers outside the work
area.
In February 1987, EPA career staffers issued a little-read report on
what they perceived to be the priority issues for the agency.
exposure in the workplace received a "number one ranking."

-15-

Asbestos

Occupational asbestos deaths have been subjected to some controversy.
Dr. Selikoff, now retired, said in 1985 that asbestos exposure

aims a

life every 58 minutes while the Asbestos Victims of America, a
activist group, has circulated literature claiming that three
every hour from asbestos exposure.

e die

In June 1987, a team of medical

researchers from Temple University concluded that "nearly half of all
reported cases of asbestosis may have been incorrectly diagnosed
detection limits of the typical chest X-ray."

to

One of the researchers, Dr.

Arnold Friedman, told AOR, "I don•t think people should be compensated for
having asbestos-related diseases unless they have a computeri
scan. 11

Dr. Friedman said computerized tomography

11

patient suffering breathing difficulties has emphysema rather
asbestosis.
The fi

word on asbestos risks in the workplace belongs

Fed-OSHA which has overhauled its asbestos regul
years.

ons

times in

The most recent revision, June 20, 1986, included a

reduction in the amount of asbestos fibers which a
subjected to during the work day (the permissible exposure
OSHA concluded,
to 0.2 fibers/cc

11

, or

)

.

Reducing the permissible exposure level
reduces the risk (death) from lifetime

years) from 64 per 1,000 (workers) to 6.7 per 1,000.

OSHA also

in issuing the new PEL that for a 20-year exposure,

on

.0

fibers to 0.2 fibers represented a 90 percent reduction in
Finally, OSHA, which estimates that 746,228 workers in

on

industry and 541,998 workers involved in automotive clutch

ir

are exposed to asbestos, offered the following justification for i
current PEL reduction:
-16-

Given that a significant risk of harm persists even at
very low levels of lifetime exposure to asbestos, OSHA's
decision to promulgate a PEL of 0.2 f/cc is based on a
determination that this level is the lowest level that
can feasibly be attained in operations in the workplace
in both general industry and construction."
11

Removal Is A Known Risk
The greatest threat to health comes from the improper removal of
asbestos materials.

Noted researcher, Donald N. Dewees, has estimated the

dry removal of asbestos insulation could today easily recreate the
breathing conditions which insulation workers were subjected to more than a
quarter-century ago.
In 1986, a team of researchers studying the impact of environmental
fibers on respiratory cancer had this to say about the act of taking
asbestos materials from a building:

"Asbestos removal is difficult to

control, however, and in buildings in which average levels are low, the
exposure to both workers and occupants caused by asbestos removal may
actually increase the health hazard." 9
The Ontario Royal Commission on Asbestos, a Canadian government study
effort headed by Dewees, concluded in 1984, that "while the presence of
asbestos-containing friable material in buildings does not in general cause
significant health risks for building occupants, it may cause significant
risks for building workers, including custodial, maintenance, renovation,
removal and demolition workers ...
Therefore, asbestos fibers released during a work disturbance, could
adversely affect the health of one individual, a janitor for example, or
even office workers who were adjacent to an area in which asbestos
materials were being removed.
-17-

As will be detailed in Chapter Four, ''Flaws In The Laws," there is a
considerable amount of improperly performed asbestos removal work in
California.

Therefore, while risk projections tend to categorize

in buildings as a "minimal risk," there is concern that removal
raise exposure potential to dangerous levels.
The next chapter focuses on what triggers asbestos spills and
asbestos is removed from buildings.
Conclusion
In producing death projections for low-level nonoccupational asbestos
exposure, researchers issue this disclaimer:

"more research needed.''

no one disputes the fact that improper removal creates a health risk
releasing fibers.

Maintenance workers may be at risk.

Meanwhile the EPA

believes one fiber could kill and that air monitoring is not an
hazard assessment tool.

The Department of Health Services agrees that

r

monitoring can be be misleading in judging an asbestos problem.
Recommendation
Eliminate the use of air monitoring in qualifyi

schools for

from the State Asbestos Abatement Fund (Section 49410.7 of the

on

Code) due to the large body of research which min

's

accuracy in detecting potential asbestos hazards ..

-18-

zes air moni

FOOTNOTES
Chapter 2

1.

U.S. EPA, Airborne Asbestos Health Assessment Update, Environmental
Criteria and Assessment Office, Research Triangle Park; U.S. EPA Doc.
No. EPA-600/8/84-003A, December 1985.

2.
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CHAPTER III
THE FIBER RELEASE FACTORS

In a future year an alarm may sound whenever materials in a building
release asbestos fibers into a breathing area.

The Contamination Alert!

If such detection systems were available today, we might be provided with
answers to the following key questions concerning fiber releases in
buildings:
(1)

How often do they occur?

(2)

Does each release constitute a genuine health threat?

But, until a system is invented, or until asbestos is eliminated from
buildings, health regulators, let by the EPA, recommend that building
owners take appropriate action to prevent conditions which can cause a
fiber release, also called ''an asbestos spill."
As detailed in the EPA's "Guidance for Controlling Asbestos-Containing
Materials In Buildings" (June, 1985}, a fiber release can be triggered by
one, or a combination of any of the following conditions:
o

0

change in building use (movement of occupants, air conditioning
system kicks on, other building vibrations );
routine cleaning (mop hits wall, vacuum cleaner stirs dust);

o

deterioration (water damage, fire damage, aging);

o

vandalism (sticking pencils in ceilings, throwing hard objects
against walls);

0

renovation or repair work.
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The asbestos spill is episodic in nature.

There may be no detec

fibers in the air until the air conditioning system is activa
same time children change classes in a school.

e

at

The combination

traffic, increased air flow and the presence of already

e

asbestos-containing material may be sufficient to trigger a release
might last less than one minute.

A more likely scenario would

ve

workers who tear down a ceiling, unaware that they are releasi

as

tos

dust throughout the room.

Not Covered by law
There is no state law which specifically defines what cons
fiber release condition in a building.

tu

a

AB 1348 (Floyd) and SB

are current two-year bills which seek to add a definition of an a

tos

hazard to Section 17920.3 of the Health and Safety Code (
conditions which warrant abatement by the building owner; i.e.
housing).
There is no federal law which defines what consti
hazard in a building other than the EPA regulation
materials in public and private schools (K-12).
While the law may be vague in defining an indoor asbestos
has been quite explicit in its intent to control fi
renovation or demolition of a building.

t

eases

The potential

release associated with increased air flow in a building
exposure dangers posed by removing thousands of square-feet
asbestos-containing materials from a building.

Currently

disturbance of asbestos materials in California is motivated
following four "conditions: 11
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la

sea e

one

(1)

Required by Law.

Since 1973, the EPA, under the National

Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (authorized by Section 112
of the Clean Air Act), has required that asbestos-containing materials be
removed from a building prior to its demolition.

Furthermore, asbestos

must be removed in a specified manner prior to demolition or when large
amounts of asbestos materials are involved in renovation work (details of
asbestos regulations are on page 40.

This federal requirement is intended

to reduce, if not eliminate, the release of asbestos fibers into the

•

ambient air during major reconstruction work.

About 3,300 demolition and

major asbestos renovation jobs were reported in 1986 in California, based
on Cal-OSHA and EPA records.

About 85 percent of the work occurred in

commercial buildings.
(2) Accelerated Renovation.

The investment community is beginning to

shy away from buildings with asbestos.

Tenants squawk when they discover

their offices are laden with asbestos.

The marketplace reluctance to

11

touch 11 buildings with asbestos has, in some cases, prompted owners to

accelerate renovation plans.

Therefore, while these owners are complying

with federal law by having asbestos removed prior to renovation, they are,
nonetheless, initiating the work, to some degree, out of marketplace
pressures.
(3)

Health Hazard.

Schools have been in the forefront of efforts to

abate asbestos hazards without timing removal with reconstruction.

Chapter

Five is devoted entirely to examining the triumphs and tragedies of EPA's
Asbestos-In-Schools program.
The State Department of General Services has embarked on an extensive
campaign to eliminate 11 priority asbestos hazards 11 from state buildings.
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Asbestos policies of various state institutions are covered in Chapter Six.
Abatement of an asbestos hazard can be achi
removal.

by means

Materials can be repaired or encapsulated wi

a sealant; a

barrier can be erected to prevent release of fibers into a

area·

or the asbestos area in question can be eliminated from normal

il

use.
As this report emphasizes, there are no federal or state laws, outs
of the EPA school regulation, which specifically define the
responsibilities of owners of buildings containing damaged or
asbestos materials which are releasing fibers.

orati

To date, removal

asbestos strictly for health reasons is a voluntary action, even in our
schools where the EPA still does not mandate removal.
(4)

~~entional/Unintentional

Abuses.

A common

se

removal practices occurs when an electrician or plumber for example
encounters asbestos materials on the job.

He does

want

s ow

project down by "subbing out" to an abatement contractor, so

removes

material himself -- and he does the work improperly.
engage in unsafe, underground removal practices to avoid
insurer who would certainly raise the contractor's ra
to handle carcinogenic materials on the job.

h
if

were

In other cases,

contractor may be unaware that he is handling asbestos; or

ildi

owner, sensing he has an expensive asbestos problem on his

h res

cheap, unskilled labor to rip out ''old pipe insulation" in
the night.

No state or federal agency is effecti

in California.

lici

ses

In fact, state and federal officials believe

"at least

y

half" of all asbestos removal work is done improperly.
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is

cause for concern here since improper removal practices endanger building
occupants as well as workers.
The next chapter examines "Flaws In The Laws,", i.e., the reasons why
improper asbestos removal work is allowed to occur.
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CHAPTER IV
FlAWS IN THE lAWS

The evidence is mounting.

A significant portion of asbestos removal

work in California involves unsafe handling practices.

Some officials

believe as much as half of the asbestos materials taken from buildings is
either removed improperly and/or dumped illegally.

Officials conclude that

unsafe handling practices may expose workers to high concentrations of
asbestos fibers, and, that, in some instances, "innocent'' building
occupants could be exposed to fibers left over from sloppy removal jobs.
Removal abuses occur despite the fact that state and federal code books
are thick with laws and regulations covering asbestos work practices.
Simply put, there are flaws in the laws that hurt, not help, enforcement
activities.
First, the EPA and Cal-OSHA both require that contractors, and in some
cases building owners, notify them before a specified amount of asbestos
material is removed from a building.

The logic is sound.

Asbestos removal

generally occurs at the start of a demolition or renovation project.

In

fact, the EPA requires that asbestos materials be removed before a building
demolition, or major renovation work can be initiated.
not on the job "early," they miss the worm.

If inspectors are

Consequently, if notification

is given late, or not at all, inspections generally do not occur.
In testimony presented to the EPA in January 1987 on proposed changes
to asbestos regulations, the National Association of Demolition Contractors
issued the following statement:
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11

Most contractors believe that there is little poten al
for being cited if notification is not tendered in
accordance with the regulation. Many feel that
notification substantially increases the chance
citation. If a contractor elects to defy the
notification requirement . . . his chief objective
becomes quick completion of the work. Little attention
is given to expensive work practices prescribed
the
regulation. This course of action can result in profits
much larger than the total job cost. 11
Janet Crawford, an enforcement officer for the EPA's Air Management
Division, Region IX, notes that the federal reporting regul

ion allows

written notification to be mailed to the EPA as long as the
postmarked prior to the start of removal.

She adds that small removal

will be completed before an inspector has any realis
job site.

is

c chance to

j

s

on

In essence, the U.S. Postal Service aids some abatement

contractors to escape the law.
Even though Cal-OSHA does not provide inspectors

k removal

conducted by private contractors, it still requires noti

cation (th s

enigma explained later in Chapter).

Cal-OSHA informs contractors

notification information is turned over to Fed-OSHA i
Christopher Lee, Fed-OSHA Audit Supervisor in Cali
Cal-OSHA•s notifications are generally received

ia,
late

use on

small removal jobs.
Fed-OSHA does not require contractors to give as

ons

The EPA does not share its notification information
turn, has not asked for it, according to officials from both federal
agencies.
EPA, Fed-OSHA, and Cal-OSHA officials agree that unreported work
probably involves safety violations.

Aside from cutting costs, other

reasons behind unreported asbestos work include the foll
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in

A plumbing contractor, for example, may encounter asbestos
materials periodically -- he does not want his insurance carrier to
know he handles asbestos materials; consequently, he does not
obtain a state certificate (required by California law) to work
with asbestos.

Since he is not properly credentialed, he cannot

legally give notification (proof of certification is required).
Some contractors or maintenance personnel are unaware that they are
removing asbestos materials during a reconstruction or repair job.
Many asbestos-containing materials are not easily identifiable
except through laboratory analyses.
A building owner does not want tenants to know asbestos is in the
building, so materials are quietly removed during the weekend
without regulatory intrusion.

In some cases owners are not willing

to pay up to $30 per square-foot for removal work done correctly,
so they turn to unlicensed contractors.
On September 29, 1987, Governor Deukmejian vetoed the State
Legislature's first effort (SB 895, Marks) specifically aimed at policing
illegal asbestos work.

This measure would have established a special

investigative unit within the Contractors' State License Board to track
down removal violators.

In his veto message the Governor indicated the

need for a crackdown on illegal asbestos work had not been adequately
demonstrated.

Indeed, the board had only five complaints on record

relative to improper asbestos work.

In addition the Department of Justice

was not actively pursuing any asbestos contractors.

A few days prior to

the veto, however, Board Deputy Robert Berrigan, in an address to 300
contractors and consultants at the National Asbestos Council's trade
convention in Oakland, made the following observation:
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"The Governor will veto SB 895 for the wrong reasons.
We do not have the ability to react in a timely manner.
And because our response is slow and the industry
it, contractors don't bother telling us
ill
asbestos work. We need some people to snoop
As of November 30, 1987, the board had a backlog

,000

a

regarding all types of construction work.
Berrigan also offered two other explanations behind
complaints on asbestos contractors:
The board accepts only complaints that are si

an i

Many people, especially employees, do not want to
paper.

Also, the board has no jurisdiction over

relations, a matter now in the hands of
Asbestos removal is the first phase of recons
abatement contractor is usually fini
begin work; i.e., there are no wi
There are other "signs 11 which suggest

as

deserves closer watch by the regulators:
0

In 1984 Cal-OSHA conducted 47 random
at construction sites.

Asbestos vi

were

the 47 sites, even though inspectors
0

In 1985 Cal-OSHA issued 109 citations to
register as asbestos handlers.

In the same year

that 25 percent of reported asbestos
to be cited for safety violations.

-30-

j

n

ion

From January 1986 through June 1987, Cal-OSHA issued 103 ''serious"

0

violations involving asbestos work in addition to shutting down
12 jobs for safety violations that posed an imminent threat to
health.
o

Cal-OSHA was able to inspect about only two percent of all reported
asbestos removal work from 1983 through 1986.

The amount of

reported work more than doubled from 1985 to 1986, jumping from
1,500 to 3,379 jobs.

•

Therefore, thousands of legally reported

removal jobs were not checked by state inspectors while an unknown,
but potentially significant, amount of work was never reported or
inspected.

We estimate that currently 70 percent of the abatement

work in California is not inspected by any regulatory body.
As will be detailed later in the chapter, EPA and local air management
districts send inspectors to asbestos jobs, but their concerns center
around the release of asbestos fibers outside the work area.

These

inspectors have no jurisdiction over employer-employee relations and,
consequently, often do not enter the work area where serious work
violations occur.
0

In 1986 Cal-OSHA checked 51 school asbestos removal jobs and found
serious violations at three projects while a fourth removal job had
to be stopped on the spot due to imminent health risks caused by
sloppy abatement work.

While the presence of any serious violation

is not acceptable, the small number of botched school removal jobs
was much lower than other state or national inspection results.
Robert Turkington, former head of Cal-OSHA's Occupational Carcinogen
Control Unit, offered this explanation:
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"Contractors were ready for us -- they expected a
surprise inspection. The school inspections were
completed in about one-third the time of normal asbestos
checks because everyone had things in order. 11
California's low rate of asbestos inspections contras

sharply

Oklahoma, for example, where each asbestos removal job is inspec

an

average of seven times before completion.
Fed-OSHA conducted 2,325 inspections and issued two asbes

citations

in California from July 1, 1987 through October 23, 1987;
does not know how many inspections involved asbestos work since, an
official explained, the checks are not targeted in

for

removal work.
In January 1986 Turkington commented on the rate of unreported removal
work:
have our hands full dealing with what we know -- the
reported work. The unknown co~ld be worse. As
tos is
being ripped out all over the state without proper
notification. I am afraid we are looking at the s
and not at what is casting the shadow. 11
0

In April 1987 the Contractors' State license Boa

, respondi

a

request by Assemblywoman Jackie Speier, confirmed that in a s

ing

of companies advertising in the Yellow Pages under
Removal," 16 of 31 companies were not legally
asbestos work.

i

Turkington said his Cal-OSHA unit would

find a dozen contractors per year who were not

is

ica

y

to

with asbestos, but who advertised in the tel
0

Some building owners require that an indus

al

ienist oversee

the work of an abatement contractor to insure there are no
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releases outside the work area, or improper work practices inside
the removal area.

Current federal law allows a contractor to

monitor his own work.

Several hygienists informed AOR that

abatement contractors in the Los Angeles area will raise their bid
prices 30 to 35 percent when they learn that they will have their
work "watched" by an industrial hygienist functioning as a project
manager.

The increased bids reflect the need to use more expensive

safety equipment and time-consuming safety procedures during
removal.
Thomas E. Veratti, a certified chemical engineer, and Christopher
Eident, a certified industrial hygienist, made the following observation in
"Practical Consideration In The Monitoring Of Abatement Projects":
"Approximately 50 percent of asbestos removal work
performed by removal contractors is done without a
specification, without independent supervision and
without certified or trained workers. Removal companies
often take their own air samples with questionable
value. In the laboratory, we have received obviously
tampered with pre-tests and post-tests that are blanks."
Abatement contractors informed AOR of other questionable business
practices such as:
A contractor will have six work crews, four of which are comprised
of well-trained, well-equipped workers.

Due to increasing

business, he has added two crews, but, for a variety of reasons,
has not trained the workers properly.
not have all safety equipment.

Also, these two crews will

Regulators will be notified about

jobs involving the four "good" crews while no notification will
accompany work performed by the two, ill-prepared crews.
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Some companies change names frequently to keep one s

a

inspectors and customer complaints; removal companies

11

advertise in the Yellow Pages under one name,

al

t

under another name.
The nation's largest removal company, Commodore Envi

wi

annual revenues exceeding $100 million, has sugges
abatement contractors pay a fee to cover the cost

a "trust

will oversee all abatement activities to insure

all

are followed.

Christopher Gale, Commodore vi

all removal companies were compelled to
most abatement companies would go out of

siness.

Steve Allen, director of Asbestos Division,
Department explained that removal

S

in

fee to cover the cost of daily state inspections.
regulation of removal work stems from past
jobs which forced the permanent closure of several
laws

Better enforcement of existing as
more than a special investigative unit.

n

rrent

are incredibly uncoordinated, as evidenced
enforcement agencies and their responsibili ies

The Department of Industrial Relations (Cal-OSHA)
On November 20, 1987, Cal-OSHA informed AOR
contractor in California was in violation
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state aw.

as

The Cal-OSHA story is not an easy one to tell, or understand. We will
attempt a chronological approach:
1. June 1986 -- Fed-OSHA issues new asbestos work regulations which
are stricter than Cal-OSHA's (Section 5208, Title 8 of the
California Administrative Code).
2.

January 1987 -- The Governor proposes to abolish Cal-OSHA
enforcement in the private sector; i.e., no more inspections of
asbestos projects.

3.

February 1987 -- The Department of Industrial Relations announces
it may require that certain permits (asbestos) be obtained by
contractors.

4. May 1987 --The Department reverses itself -- no permits will be
required after Fed-OSHA takes over July 1, 1987. May 22, 1987,
Cal-OSHA asbestos registration regulations are published. (Title
8, Section 341.7-341.14, California Administrative Code)
5. July 1987 -- Fed-OSHA assumes concurrent jurisdiction in
California. Cal-OSHA inspectors are laid off.
6. August 17, 1987 --Cal-OSHA announces that it will require asbestos
contractors to give work notifications and to register as handlers
of asbestos materials. Notification information will be passed on
to Fed-OSHA.
7. October 27, 1987 --A state Court of Appeal orders Governor
Deukmejian to restore the Cal-OSHA program after ruling that the
Governor overreached his veto power in eliminating $7 million which
the State Legislature had put in the 1987-88 state budget for the
program. The Governor appeals to the state Supreme Court. The
high court could take a year to reach a decision on the fate of
Cal-OSHA.
8. November 23, 1987 -- No contractor has adequately satisfied the
registration requirements for handling asbestos. Thirty
applications submitted. Many denied for failure to provide proper
health coverage to employees or proper training of employees.
9.

December 1987 -- Cal-OSHA has still not completed an overhaul of
asbestos regulations for public employees (Fed-OSHA has no
jurisdiction over public employees). Therefore, state asbestos
standards are weaker than EPA standards which cover public
employees in states which do not have a state plan. EPA
regulations are almost identical to the June 1986 Fed-OSHA
regulations. In a December 28, 1987 memo to Cal-OSHA inspectors,
Deputy Chief Director, Dr. Frank Ciofalo referred to existing state
asbestos regulations covering public employees as "obsolete in
terms of employee protection." Furthermore, private sector
contractors, understandably confused by the status of Cal-OSHA,
are, in some cases, using Cal-OSHA's occupational exposure standard
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of 2.0 fibers per/cc air rather than 0.2 fibers per eclair,
current Fed-OSHA standard. The much lower federal exposure level
is the law in California for private contractors.
At a hearing of the State Assembly Labor and Employment
December 21, 1987, Cal-OSHA announces that
six
the
546 board-certified asbestos contractors are
11y
do work in California (One month later the regi
reached 21).
On August 17, 1987, Cal-OSHA issued the following statement to
contractors regarding the state's right to require asbes
i

on:

"The Division's authority to register pri
employers engaged in asbestos-related work s
its continuing jurisdiction over all matters
1n1
to employment (Labor Code 6303(b); Troy Gold v. OSHAB
{1986), 187 Cal. App. 3d, 379), the need, in
its jurisdiction over public sector employers
the enforcement and consultation personnel
to be kept informed of asbestos-related
such work is performed, and the implicit statutory
mandate that the Division continue to act in
interests of public health and safety.
law,
Therefore, based upon our understanding of
ion
unless and until a court of competent ju
require
otherwise directs, the Division will continue
registration of all employers and contractors engaged in
Code
asbestos-related work in accordance with
the
Section 6501.5, and other applicable sections
Code ...
11

Basically, any contractor who during one year
100-square-feet of asbestos containing materi

les more

s, mus

s

Cal-OSHA by providing the following proof:
certification from the Contractors' State License
medical coverage or a $500 trust account
insure the payment of medical exam(s) as

law;

documentation that each employee has been

i

specifications in Section 5208, Title 8 of

a

Administrative Code, and the regulations under
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to

a written list of major asbestos hazard control equipment that the
employer has available for use;
a written description of the employer's air monitoring program.
In addition, the contractor must notify Cal-OSHA in writing prior to
the start of each asbestos job. The following information shall be
provided:
-- job location;
precise physical location of the asbestos work at the jobsite;
estimated start and finish date;
-- name of certified supervisor responsible for the work;
name of person responsible for conducting air monitoring, fitting
of respiratory equipment;
description of work practices;
acknowledgement that the Division can revoke registration if there
is not full compliance with the registration requirements.
Enforcement of the registration requirement takes imagination.

For

example, in late November 1987 Cal-OSHA's Fred Ottoboni, now retired,
received a complaint from a San Francisco resident concerning an asbestos
removal job at a downtown office building. The resident said Fed-OSHA had
not responded in a positive manner to the complaint request.

Ottoboni

eventually sent a letter informing the building owner that the contractor
was not properly registered with Cal-OSHA and, consequently, was in
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violation of state law.

The San Francisco District Attorney's office was

also informed of the apparent violation.

Ottoboni said that under state

law (Section 6505.5 of the Labor Code) a building owner who knowi
employs an asbestos contractor who is working in violation of exist

law

is subject to a fine of $5,000 and up to six months in jail.
However, Ottoboni noted that a more effective, quicker enforcement
measure might be for the Contractors' State License Board to pull the
license of a contractor who is not registered.

But Board enforcement

deputies said they were unsure of "their right'' to uphold a Cal-OSHA
regulation, especially one that was not actively enforced by Cal-OSHA.
With the elimination of Cal-OSHA's inspection force, the state is
engaged in a "paper chase'' enforcement of employer-employee asbestos laws.
Federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (Fed-OSHA)
The handling of asbestos materials by private sector workers in
California is regulated by Fed-OSHA which last amended its as
in June 1986 (29 CFR Parts 1910 and 1926). A key provision stipul

t

employers must establish a "regulated area" when the airborne

ion

of asbestos exceeds 0.2 fibers per cc of air, averaged over an 8-hour
Approved respirators must be worn and where feasible, negative
enclosures must be set up.

sure

The intent of this regulation is

employees from high exposure levels and to confine asbestos

the

sealed work area.
As noted previously, Fed-OSHA does not require asbestos noti
nor does it target asbestos removal work for inspections.

-38-

cations,

Finally, Fed-OSHA regulations allow a contractor to conduct his own air
testing to insure that asbestos levels do not reach the action level of
0.1 fibers per cc -- a fiber count which triggers medical monitoring of the
exposed workers. As noted before, some contractors believe an independent
source should conduct air monitoring tests to insure that a contractor
cannot cover up sloppy work by "doctoring 11 his own air samples.
Contractors• State license Board

Since April 1986 the Board has distributed over 500,000 pamphlets
explaining state and federal asbestos laws to contractors.

The Board also

oversees the administration of a certification exam for contractors who
work with 100-square-feet or more of asbestos materials.

Board Deputy

Berrigan stated that 546 contractors have passed the exam which tests
knowledge of asbestos hazards (Section 7058.5 of the Business and
Professions Code).
The Board has not taken any action against asbestos contractors other
than to issue warning letters to a handful of companies which were
advertising improperly in the Yellow Pages.
Cal-OSHA's Dr. Ciofalo, has suggested that the Contractors• Board not
issue an asbestos certificate until the contractor has registered with
Cal-OSHA as an asbestos handler.
of 40 trades may take the exam.

Currently, a contractor licensed in any
Ciofalo is concerned that contractors,

once they are Board-certified, appear to the public to be "okayed 11 by the
state when, in fact, they may not have trained employees or own the right
equipment to remove asbestos.

In fact, Turkington, before he resigned from
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Cal-OSHA, stated that a "sure-fire'' way to insure that a contractor knew
how to remove asbestos properly would be to inspect the equipment he owned

United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
The EPA's marching orders are contained in the National Emissions
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, first published in 1973 as a
mandate of the Clean Air Act.

Building owners and asbestos removal

contractors are responsible for complying with the standard, last
April 1984.

The intent of the regulations is to prevent "visi

emissions" of asbestos into the environment.
removed prior to the demolition of a building.
concentration limits are specified.

e

Asbestos materials must
However, no air

The rule requires the

Notification to EPA and/or the local air quality management
district or air pollution control district when a building is
demolished or when at least 260 linear-feet on pipes and
square-feet of asbestos on other surface materials

11

or stripped;
Sets standards for wet removal and treatment

als;

asbestos

Prohibits spray application of materials that contain more
one percent asbestos, and prohibits use of molded and friable or
wet-applied asbestos materials.
California is divided into 41 air pollution control districts.

n

17 districts the EPA is the lead with the State Air Resources
providing technical assistance.

There are 24 districts whi

essentially on their own to enforce the EPA regulations.
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are

In some cases a

local district can enact tougher air pollution regulations.

For example,

the EPA regulation does not cover work done on single family dwellings
while the Bay Area Air Quality Management District does include homes under
the reporting requirements.
Ed Wong, the lone asbestos inspector for removal work at the Air
Resources Board, conducts only about five inspections per year -- only five
to ten percent of his time is devoted to asbestos matters.

He said rural

areas usually lack the resources to police asbestos -- that is why they
defer to the EPA.

However, the EPA has only one inspector to cover these

17 districts.
The EPA's Inspector General recently blasted its air management
division for touching only about 20 percent of the work it is legally
responsible to do, noted Crawford.

She is hoping for another three staff

positions for Region IX, which is currently bogged down with eight criminal
lawsuits involving asbestos violations.

If she had the time, she said, she

might invoke Section 114 of the Clean Air Act which requires a contractor
to describe his past removal jobs -- there are criminal penalties for
falsifying this information.

Crawford said this information would be a way

of documenting past job performances and, as such, would be helpful to
school districts, for example, concerned about the performance quality of a
low bidder.
Inspections by air management districts center around notification
compliance and generally do not involve a walk-through check of removal
work in progress.

In fact, many district inspectors do not own a

respirator which would be required equipment if they were to enter a sealed
removal area.
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The two largest districts are the South Coast Air Management District
and the Bay Area Air Quality Management District.

In 1986 South Coast,

which covers the counties of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, and parts of
San Bernardino, fielded three inspectors who checked 431 of 1,638 removal
jobs reported, and, subsequently, issued 26 "notices of violation.''

Bay

Area, with 39 inspectors, inspected 336 of 1,098 jobs reported between
April 1986 and April 1987, resulting in the issuance of eight safety
violations.
Notification of the EPA or the air management districts is triggered by
the removal of a large amount of asbestos -- 160 square feet or more.
Inspectors say they deal primarily with 15 to 20 major removal contractors
and do not hear from the 150 small contractors who, based on Cal-OSHA
estimates, work on short duration jobs.
As is detailed in the next Chapter, the EPA's main impact on asbestos
has come through its regulations for public and private schools, K-12.

More Review Required
This year the State Legislature is expected to review at least a dozen
asbestos bills.

Special consideration should be given to the technical

definition of asbestos, the 11 Workability 11 of the law requiring a building
owner to identify asbestos before contracting out for remodeling work, and
the consistent pattern of state departments issuing mandated reports and
regulations way beyond a specified completion date.
(1)

In 1986, the definition of asbestos was defined by SB 2572 (CH.

1451) as 11 manufactured construction material which contains more than one
tenth of one percent asbestos by weight 11 (Section 6501.8, Labor Code,
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subsection (b)).

The EPA recognizes asbestos as any material containing

more than one percent asbestos by weight.

Bulk sampling laboratories are

generally unable to detect asbestos in the minute amounts set by state law.
In written testimony presented in 1987 to the Assembly Housing and
Community Development Committee regarding asbestos in housing, David
Calabria, president of National Econ Corporation, stated, "Your committee
would be hard-pressed to find a single project conducted in the state of
California which is in compliance with the one-tenth of one percent
standard."
(2) A building owner often has inside knowledge of the presence of
asbestos-containing materials within his building.

Under current state law

(Section 6505.5 of the Labor Code, subsection (b)), the owner has to make a
11

good-faith 11 effort to determine if asbestos is present before he contracts

to have his building structurally altered.

Contractors supported this

provision in 1985 (AB 2040, CH. 1587) because they claimed they would often
encounter asbestos during a job--discoveries which forced an immediate
shut-down of work until the materials could be removed.

AOR could not find

any district attorney who had prosecuted under this provision of law which
contractors say should be reworked to inspire building owners to play a
greater role in identifying asbestos materials. The Legislature may want
to pursue this issue.
(3) The roll call of 11 better late than never 11 asbestos reports and
regulations is appalling:
-- The State Department of Health Services was to immediately begin a
study of asbestos in public buildings after the Governor signed urgency
legislation (CH. 115, Statutes of 1986) on May 28, 1986. The $800,000
survey of 240 buildings may not be completed until mid-or-late-1988.
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-- The State Department of Health Services released a report on the
efficacy of air monitoring for asbestos hazards in our schools in November
1987, 11 months beyond its due date mandated in urgency legislation (CH.
1587, Statutes of 1985).
-- Cal-OSHA asbestos regulations for public employees will probably not
be brought into compliance with stricter federal rules until more than two
years beyond the June 1986 date when Fed-OSHA issued the revised asbestos
regulations.

Asbestos regulations for consultants,_mandated by urgency

legislation (CH. 1451, Statures of 1986) may never be completed, according
to asbestos consultants who have asked Cal-OSHA for a due date on the
regulation.
-- Cal-OSHA registration regulations for asbestos contractors were
published five months, 22 days beyond the mandated due date (CH. 1587,
Statutues of 1985) and the actual registration forms were not avilable to
contractors until August 17, 1987
The Legislature should consider the ramifications of future bills which
place importance on a timely completion of an asbestos report or
regulations.
Conclusion
State and federal regulators are not effectively policing asbestos
abatement work in California.

Enforcement of work practices must be

improved before new programs are instituted which promote abatement of
asbestos hazards in buildings.
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Recommendations

1.

If Cal-OSHA's jurisdiction is restored in the private sector,

require that no abatement project over 160-square feet, or 260 linear-feet,
could begin until a Cal-OSHA inspector had personally visited the removal
site to approve the work plan, including approval of respirators to be worn
and negative air pressure equipment to be employed during removal.
Exemptions would be provided for emergency clean-up of asbestos spills.
Expanded Cal-OSHA inspection staff could be paid for, in part, by
inspection fees assessed contractors. Also, increase investigations of
unregistered contractors.
2.

Require the Contractors' State License Board to obtain proof from

Board-certified asbestos contractors that they are also registered with
Cal-OSHA.

Failure to show proof of registration within 90 days would

invalidate current certification.

No new certificates could be issued to

unregistered contractors. To satisfy the registration requirement that a
contractor be certified, the contractor would take the certification exam
prior to registration.

If he passed, the Board would notify Cal-OSHA which

would then act on the registration.

The Board would only issue a

certificate after it was notified by Cal-OSHA that the contractor was
registered.
3.

If Cal-OSHA private sector enforcement powers are not restored, or

actively employed, then establish an asbestos enforcement unit within the
State Contractors' License Board to pursue unlicensed or unregistered
contractors who perform asbestos removal work.
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4.

Prohibit conflict of interest relationships between asbestos

consultants and abatement contractors; and project monitors and abatement
contractors.
5. Amend the state's definition of asbestos to "one percent of more by
weight"--current standard is "one-tenth of one percent by weight."
6.

Adopt the federal asbestos regulation (20 CFR Parts 1910 and 1926)

on an urgency, interim basis for public employees until Cal-OSHA publishes
its updated regulation.
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CHAPTER V
SCHOOLS: LOSING THE WAR

The EPA-led attempts to manage asbestos in our schools should serve as
a national lesson in how not to regulate an environmental hazard.
Wasteful, almost tragic, policy decisions have permeated the asbestos-inschools program since the EPA first offered schools technical assistance in
1979.
Now the EPA, acting at the direction of Congress, has raised the stakes
by issuing the most comprehensive asbestos management regulation for
schools in our nation's history. The new rule, effective December 14,
1987, was crafted to make amends for a 1982 regulation which lacked
specific exposure control directives.

Success will be difficult, however,

due to an unrealistic time-frame for compliance and the continued EPA
philosophy that asbestos problems should ultimately be handled by local
decision-making, including local financing of abatement projects.
This chapter will cover the weaknesses in the 1982 EPA asbestos
regulation, and how the new rule, although a vast improvement over the
original regulation, is filled with problem areas that could jeopardize the
safety and health of school children and employees.
In the late 1970s after the EPA banned the spray application of
asbestos in buildings, environmental and employee groups lobbied the EPA to
set ••asbestos standards" for buildings. The EPA, acknowledging that public
resources were limited, focused on schools where "asbestos exposure in
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children is of special concern:

since they have a greater remaining

life-span than adults, their lifetime risk of developing mesothelioma is
greater." 1 The EPA also contended that children have higher breathi
rates than adults and, thus, inhale more through the mouth than the nose
which filters out some contaminants.
In 1979 EPA began offering schools "information" about asbestos
This effort was followed by a May 1982 regulation which required

problems.

schools to do the following by June 28, 1983 (40 CFR, Part 763):
0

inspect buildings for friable asbestos-containing materials;

0

take samples of materials to verify the asbestos content;

o

maintain records;

o

notify parents and employees whenever friable asbestos was found.

One aim of the regulation was to apply public pressure (upset parents
and teachers) on school districts so that abatement action would soon
follow the discovery of asbestos materials.
truth, one giant push on the panic button.

The pressure tactic was, in
In New Jersey, for example,

hundreds of school districts rushed to have asbestos materials removed.

As

a result, New Jersey schools were invaded by inexperienced contractors who
improperly removed asbestos materials.

In September 1984 a New Jersey

state commission released the following comment on the school removal
efforts:
Sometimes the pressure brought to bear on the school
boards or others has resulted in the removal of asbestos
materials posing no immediate health hazard and
requiring substantial expenditures. Unfortunately,
there is considerable reason to believe that poor
removal jobs not only pose a significant health risk to
11
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the removal workers, but can liberate asbestos fibers
into the air at higher levels than existed prior to the
removal. Students and school employees who subsequently
occupy these buildings may therefore be subject to
significantly higher airborne asbestos levels after the
removal than if no action had been taken."

One-Time Oversights
In August 1987 the EPA's Office of the Inspector General presented a
House subcommittee with stinging criticisms of the 1982 regulations.
According to the Inspector General, key oversights in the regulation
I

included the following:
Schools were not required to reinspect buildings after the initial
survey; therefore, nonfriable materials which later became friable
would go undetected as well as material that was missed during the
one-time inspection.
No standards were set for what constituted proper notification of
employees and parents.

Some schools hid notices on back pages of

newsletters while many schools gave oral notifications even though
written notification was required.
Notification, as was the case with the inspection program, was a
one-time process; therefore, new employees and parents of new
students were often not informed that asbestos had been found in
the building.
The major regulatory flaw concerned what to do once a school discovered
asbestos.

The EPA did not mandate a response action, consequently some

schools "went overboard" and spent huge sums of money to pay for what, in
some cases, was unnecessary removal of asbestos.
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The vast majority of

schools, however, totally ignored the regulation.

In California the EPA

reported that over 70 percent of some 900 schools that it checked for
compl ance wi

the 1982 regulation had, in fact, not complied.

the noncompliance rate surpassed 80 percent, underscoring the beli
California school districts were not going to obey federal law unless a
federal inspector personally visited a school district and, subsequently,
issued a violation notice.
In March 1984 state Superintendent Bill Honig reported that 3,
California public schools, K-12, had, based on surveys submitted by
districts, friable asbestos-containing materials and that about half these
schools had, in some manner, abated the asbestos
1lion.

rds at a cost

He stated that another $

million was

remaining schools with removal efforts.

There were no

$160

for pri

over

to help 1,
gures avail

le

schools.

Tight Purse Strings

In August 1984 President Reagan signed the As
(ASHAA,
to

p

98-377) whi

ic and private schools

an

s

asbes
or

a half years of operation, the funding program was in
revision, as noted by the Inspector General in August, 1987:
"EPA awarded loans and grants totaling approximately
$11
llion to schools that did not have the most
critical hazards. This occurred because the Agency s
definition of qualified applicant is too broad. As a
result, EPA provided grants and loans to schools
only minor damage and health risks, while schools with
major damage and more severe health
sks did not
receive funds."
1

-50-

California has not fared well in the receipt of EPA grants and loans.
Of the $134 million distributed to the states from 1985 through June 1987,
California ranked 22nd with awards of $1,007,870.

By contrast Ohio

received over $20 million and Pennsylvania was awarded just under
$14 million.
In March, 1987, AOR released a report, Danger:

Asbestos Policies At

Work, which described funding and policy implementation problems plaguing
the asbestos abatement efforts in California public schools. The report's
major findings were as follows:
State inspections of schools may have inaccurately cleared schools
of asbestos hazards when, in fact, hazards still exist.

(This

finding prompted Superintendent Honig to call for a State Auditor
General investigation.

A July 1987 Auditor General report, The

State Department of Education Did Not Comply With Its Federal
Fiscal Year 1985-86 Agreement With the Environmental Protection
Agency Concerning Asbestos In Schools, confirmed that hazards had
been missed and that a state inspector "either directed or
encouraged some school officials to sign backdated documents
indicating that the school districts had complied with the federal
regulations.)"
The State Asbestos Abatement Fund, used to help districts pay for
abatement work, has not been used properly.
continues.

(This problem

Nancy Anton, Legislative Analyst's Office, reported as

of October 24, 1987, that the Office of Local Assistance, which
administers the Fund, had not released $18 million of $24 million
appropriated by the State Legislature for school abatement work,
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from 1984 through 1986.

In December 1987, the State Auditor

General was authorized to investigate Local Assistance s handling
1

of the Asbestos Abatement Fund --audit request made by Lieutenant
Governor Leo McCarthy).
No one in state government can accurately assess how many schools
have abated asbestos hazards since the Department of Education
estimated that 1,600 schools contained friable asbestos materials
in March 1984.
(There are still no accurate estimates of how much asbestos abatement work
remains in our public school system.)
In a December 1987 meeting with AOR, local Assistance Deputy Carl
Carmichael explained that "almost all" of the $18 million in unreleased
Asbestos Abatement Fund monies had been approved for payment by the Sta
Allocation Board.

In many cases, however, school districts had asked

funding in conjunction with major reconstruction projects which entailed
the "future 11 removal of asbestos.

These projects could be 18 months to two

years from initiation, hence the funds, although allocated, would not be
released until the removal work actually occurred.
A further obstacle in releasing funds, noted Carmichael, was

as

much as one year might pass between the time a school submitted an
application for funding and the actual receipt of bids to perform
Removal bids in 1986 and 1987 were averaging 75 percent more than the
original estimates used as the basis for approving requests.

Mushrooming

insurance costs have driven abatement prices up, stated Carmichael.
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Clearly, the reasons for slow release of funds were not articulated
well during the 1987-88 state budget process when the State Legislature,
following the recommendation of the Legislative Analyst, did not approve
any new funding for abatement work in schools in FY 87-88.
Therefore, school districts must confront the new federal asbestos
program without readily available state aid and minimal opportunities for
federal financial assistance.
New Ru 1e. New Prob 1ems

On October 22, 1986, President Reagan signed the Asbestos Hazard
Emergency Response Act (AHERA) which, for the most part, directed the EPA
to correct oversights in its 1982 asbestos rule.

In AOR's opinion -- a

viewpoint shared without objection by 20 school districts interviewed for
comments -- the EPA's "new and improved" product contains serious flaws
which will, at the very least, create severe financial problems for
hundreds of school districts.

In fact, some state officials predict that

AHERA will put a few private schools out of business.

Furthermore, while

the intent of AHERA is to establish an ongoing management plan in every
asbestos-containing school geared towards controlling the release of
asbestos fibers, the rule may actually promote asbestos fiber releases (See
Table I for explanation of AHERA requirements).

The major program faults

are as follows:
1.

Unrealistic time-frame for compliance.

Under AHERA 15,000

California schools will have to be inspected for asbestos content
nonfriable materials are to be included in the inventory -- and a
management plan, detailing how the identified material is to be controlled,
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must be devised for each school.

The plans are to be submitted for review

and approval by the Governor's designated program clearinghouse, the Office
1 Assistance, by October 12, 1988.

This Herculean task will

impossible for many schools to complete by the mandated deadline for these
reasons:
o

The final regulation was not published until October 30, 1987
School districts and Local Assistance did not receive copies
the regulation prior to December 1987.

Therefore, schools

actually will have about ten months in which to comply
first phase of AHERA.
0

Inspections and management plans must be completed by personnel
who have passed an EPA-approved asbestos training program.
first such program was not offered in California until
16, 1987.

School districts must waste precious time waiting

for an army of inspectors and planners

complete their

ining.
o

Schools are confronting AHERA in the

ddle of their

year and they are not, in many cases, prepared to
significant costs imposed by the regulations.
constraints will impede a dis

Budgetary

ct's ability to respond

AHERA in a timely fashion.
o

A limited number of inspectors and planners will be attempti
to check 15,000 schools.

Since AHERA is a national regula

on,

schools in other states are going through the same time crunch,
consequently, each state will be making demands on the limited
pool of inspectors and planners.
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2.

Quality Control Over Inspections and Planning Is lacking. Anyone

may take an EPA-approved asbestos course which, if passed, would qualify
the individual to perform asbestos work in schools.

There are no minimum

qualifications for course applicants other than they must satisfy
applicable state laws.

California does not regulate asbestos inspectors or

planners -- only three other states regulate this type of work.
While it would be premature to say California schools will be plagued
by sloppy inspections and poorly devised management plans, the asbestos
control experiences in Connecticut schools indicate there could be serious
quality control problems in California during 1988.

In brief, Connecticut,

with a public and private school system about 15 percent the size of
California's system, is some two years ahead of California and the EPA in
establishing an asbestos exposure control program for schools.

In fact,

the EPA regulations are modeled, in part, on the Connecticut plan.
Connecticut's health department director Paul Schur, in a series of 1987
briefings with California school officials on his state's "hard earned
lessons", offered the following observations:
Connecticut trained 269 inspectors and 147 planners
during a two-month period.

This process failed to weed

out incompetent inspectors and planners based on the
large number of inspections and plans which were rejected
by Schur's department.

For example, 135 schools had

their programs halted due to the inferior work of one
accredited inspector.

Over half of the planners were

school employees while one-third were private
consultants. More than 90 percent of the school
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employees' plans were rejected while most of the private
consultants had their plans approved.

Schur warned that

while the EPA regulation encourages school employees to
engage in asbestos work, there is "no substitute for
professional experience."
Schur also asserted that careful review of each management plan is "the
best check 11 against sloppy abatement work.

He said a typical plan took one

of his health auditors two to three hours to review.
The Office of Local Assistance, California's state review agency for
asbestos plans, had only four staff people on staff to deal with asbestos
work in December 1987.

Local Assistance Deputy Director Carl Carmichael,

has stated that the asbestos plan review unit will be augmented
substantially to handle the 15,000 or so plans which eventually will find
their way

Sacramento for review--however, he would not elaborate on how

many people his office would need to meet the workload, let alone what
qualifications these people would possess.
Under the EPA regulation, Local Assistance has 90 days to act on a
submitted plan.

If the office fails to take action, the plan is

automatically approved.

Some school districts will submit plans in early

1988 in the hopes, one school official admitted, that Local Assistance will
be too disorganized to review the plans within 90 days.

On the other hand,

Local Assistance may be swamped with 10,000 plans on or near the October
12, 1988 deadline, thus setting up a situation where the office would be
unable to adequately review each plan, given the workload and lack
staff.
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Existing California law could provide some control over abatement
plans, in that Section 39148 of the Education Code requires a registered
architect, or in some cases a mechanical or electrical engineer, to prepare
plans for school alterations which cost over $20,000.

EPA instructor

Shirley Cartwright, who teaches a management planner course at the Pacific
Asbestos Information Center, U.C. Berkeley, said, however, that she has
informed students that California law does not apply to asbestos planners
when the removal work specifications involve only a weight reduction rather
than a structural change in the building.
Few architects in California design asbestos removal plans due to
unavailability of errors and commissions coverage for asbestos-related
work.

The few architects who do asbestos work, however, contend strongly

that EPA graduates who plan abatement projects are practicing architecture
without a license.

Steven Winter, a registered architect under contract

with the City of New York to identify asbestos materials in public and
private buildings, testified at a hearing of the Assembly Housing and
Community Development Committee (12/9/87) that "the performance of a
building during the removal and replacement of asbestos-containing
materials are clearly within the realm of architecture".

He stated that

industrial hygienists who plan removal projects in California are
practicing without an architect's license and are "guilty of a
misdemeanor".
Michael Chambers, a registered architect with the State Department of
Education, has argued that an industrial hygienist, for example, could
submit a plan for the abatement work to satisfy the EPA regulations while a
registered architect would prepare a plan for any structural changes in the
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building.

Chambers stressed that most architects are unfamiliar with the

intricacies of setting up a removal project which, in part, includes the
establishment of negative air pressure within the work area and a regulated
decontamination chamber for workers.
Finally, the unregulated work of asbestos consultants could lead to
conflict of interest problems.

Some critics believe that consultants have

a tendency to recommend costly abatement actions if they have a business
connection with a company that engages in abatement work.

Several

abatement contractors, such as Tim Hassler, president of ABMS, Inc.,
Oakland, would support a conflict of interest law for asbestos work in
schools.

Under current California law, a company that identifies asbestos

hazards can also remove them.

Furthermore, a hazard assessment company

use a different name than its affiliated abatement company, a relationship
that has

always been disclosed to clients.

though the EPA regulation

recommends that a state consider passing a law to prohibit a school
dis

hi
removal
3.

ng a firm to conduct a
it fails

mandate

assessment as well as
is

No Special Safeguards Set For Removal.

bi

on.

The EPA regulation also

fails to mandate a conflict of interest prohibition for removal contractors
and air monitoring companies, although, as is the case with planners and
abatement contractors, the regulation u
prohibition.

sta

to consider a

Under existing Fed-OSHA work regulations, a removal

contractor may monitor his own work, that is, he takes air samples to prove
that the concentration of asbestos fibers within the work area does not
exceed the permissible exposure level.

As noted previously in this report,

there have been cases of an air monitoring company providing false sample
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reports to indicate that the abatement contractor has conducted a clean
job.
In California, Local Assistance has acknowledged the problems with
monitoring abatement work by requiring that a school district which uses
the State Asbestos Abatement Fund employ an independent project monitor to
check the work of the abatement contractor.

But this requirement is a

"guideline" rather than a state law or regulation and, is not applicable to
schools which use other sources of funding to pay for asbestos removal.

In

a similar manner, the Department of General Services contracts with air
monitoring companies to check abatement contractors working in state
buildings, but this policy is not in regulation, or law.
The importance of independent monitoring is underscored by the fact
that hundreds of removal jobs occur in schools without the benefit of an
inspection by a regulatory body.

In 1986 under budget language added by

the State Legislature, Cal-OSHA was directed to inspect removal jobs in
schools.

Four inspections turned up serious violations.

Fed-OSHA, the

active enforcement authority in California schools, does not have any plans
to monitor removal work in schools in accordance with EPA regulations.
4.

Too Many Options Spoil The Rules. The 1982 EPA asbestos regulation

lacked details.

The new regulation is crammed with detailed written

descriptions of asbestos conditions which are designed to guide schools in
reaching an abatement decision.

In its introduction to the regulation,

however, the EPA freely admits that the rule allows administrators to
select a variety of responses:
"However, a rigid response action decision structure is
not appropriate for this rule, primarily because many
asbestos hazard situations are too circumstantial and
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appropriate response actions are too (hazard specific)
to fit neatly into a discrete set of prescriptive
categories. There appears, then, no substitute for the
judgement of the accredited management planner, who must
recommend appropriate response action within the general
requirements established in Sec. 763.90."
Later on in the regulation, the EPA adds:
"The rules, however, are not designated to prefer one
response over another, but to allow schools the
flexibility to deal with their particular situations.
The important point for purposes of this rule, is that
varying local circumstances will drive the decision on
the appropriate response action."
Key to local decision-making is the EPA•s belief that economics must
play a key part in choosing a response, as noted in the regulation:
"From among the actions that protect human health and
the environment, the LEA (Local Education Agency) may
select the response action that is least burdensome. 11
There are five accepted responses:

(1) operations and maintenance

(keep an eye on the material) (2) repair (3) encapsulation (4) enclosure
(shut the area down) and (5) removal.

In the worst-case scenario a school,

according to the regulation, must repair "significantly damaged thermal
insulation" and if repair is not possible 11 due to technological factors,"
the material must be removed.

This is as close as the regulation gets to

mandating removal.
The definitions, themselves, lack specifics that would mandate one
particular response.

For example, "significantly damaged thermal

insulation 11 , which usually represents the highest asbestos content and
typically is of the greatest concern for health reasons, is defined as
insulation that "has lost its structural integrity, or its covering in
whole or in part, is crushed, water-stained, gouged, punctured, missing or
not intact such that it is not able to contain fibers. 11
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EPA contends that

this definition allows that "even though the insulation is marred,
scratched or otherwise marked, it may not be, in the judgment of the
accredited expert, damaged so as to release fibers."

Again, the regulation

puts the burden of the abatement decision on the management planner, or
so-called "expert".
In the realm of "least burdensome••, the EPA offers cheap, sometimes
unrealistic solutions to preventing asbestos spills.

For example, the

regulation recommends that "the problem of high school students hitting the
gym ceiling with basketballs may be eliminated by a policy prohibiting such
activities, if it can be effectively implemented." Or there is the
"installation of a stop to prevent a door from striking (and damaging)
thermal system insulation ... ".
Therefore, under the EPA regulation two schools with identical asbestos
problems can, depending on the prejudices of experts and economic
constraints, select wildly different responses:

the $2 door stop vs the

$200,000 removal job.
5.

Private Schools Must Sink or Swim In past years, EPA grants and

loans have been available to private schools seeking to comply with the
asbestos rules.

But restrictions such as $1,200 per year limit on tuition

charges have knocked many California schools out of contention.

In fact,

the EPA has not awarded one penny to a California private school, yet it
has assessed these schools over $258,000 in civil fines from 1984 through
1986 for noncompliance with the 1982 regulation.

In short, California

private schools account for 11 percent of the state•s total student
enrollment (K-12) and about 81 percent of the EPA noncompliance fines
(1984-1986).

In most cases these fines are dismissed after the school
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satisfies the federal mandates; however, the large percentage of fines
against private schools indicates that they have had a very difficult time
complying with a 1982 rule that is now considered much weaker and much less
costly to satisfy than the new regulation.

One official from Local

Assistance has predicted that the new regulation will add to the swelling
public school enrollment by putting some private schools out of business.
Private school officials contend that fighting asbestos hazards with
state assistance would not violate separation of church and state.
"This is not a classic church and state issue; it is a health issue
where financial need is the priority," stated Bruce Keuning, superintendent
of Bellflower Christian Schools and past president of the California
Association of Private Schools.

"I clearly agree with the separation of

church and state on text books, but health matters are another concern. We
are assisted by the health department in conducting earthquake safety
measures at no charge; is not asbestos a health problem?"
Keuning noted that the added cost of meeting the EPA regulation
coincides with a tripling of his school's insurance bill.
''The regulation will force schools to scrape an already empty barrel,"
he noted.
Dr. Joseph McElligot, Director of Education for the California Catholic
Conference (there are 747 Catholic schools in California with a total
enrollment of 265,000 students) stated, "We would be open to discussion on
state fundinge to help with asbestos problems.

While the state Constitution

prevents funding private schools, the courts have approved use of state
resources in busing, for example, by allowing private school students to
ride public school buses when children's safety is at hand."
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McElligot also noted that state and local governments have helped
conduct private schools earthquake inspections.
One of the hardest hit parochial school systems is the Monterey Diocese
where seven schools had abatement work conducted at a cost of $400,000 last
year.

The diocese, which did not qualify for EPA funding since its $1,700

annual tuition charge exceeded EPA's $1,200 limit, had to take out a loan
to pay for the abatement, according to superintendent Agnes Leonardich.
Governor's Expanded Role
Unlike the original 1982 regulation which did not specifically involve
the governor of a state in overseeing the implementation of the asbestosin-schools program, the new regulation requires a governor to play an
active role in determining the success of AHERA.

As noted earlier, our

Governor, as required, has named the Office of Local Assistance to approve
the management plans.
208.

But the Governor is also directed, under AHERA (Sec.

Emergency Authority), to intercede whenever a school district "is not

taking sufficient action (as determined by the Administrator or the
governor) to respond to the airborne asbestos or friable
asbestos-containing material'' ... "then the Administrator or the Governor of
a State is authorized to act to protect human health or the environment. 11
(The Administrator is the EPA.)
The Governor may be prompted to act as a result of a parent's
complaint.

Under Part 763.97, "Compliance and Enforcement," the regulation

clearly states that any citizen may direct a complaint to the Governor, or
the EPA and that the complaint shall be investigated and responded to
within "a reasonable period of time if the allegations provide a reasonable
basis to believe that a violation of the Act has occurred."
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Therefore, angry parents who have in the past have filed suit against
school districts for asbestos inaction, are now under federal law invited
to take their case directly to the Governor.

Conclusion
The intent of the new EPA regulation deserves praise.

The

establishment of an ongoing program to prevent asbestos spills in our
schools is long overdue.

If it is important to maintain a school's boiler

room furnace, it is as equally important to maintain the asbestos materials
that help keep a heating system efficient.
Clearly, the regulation recognizes the importance of assessing asbestos
materials on a case-by-case basis.
disaster.

Wholesale removal is a blueprint for

Asbestos control is a function of sound, environmental

management.
But the grand plan begins to unravel under an unrealistic time-frame
for compliance which aggravates the crying need for money and technical
expertise, both of which are in short supply in California and throughout
the nation.
State legislation can help schools alleviate some of the stress
prompted by AHERA as well as correct several quality control flaws in the
regulation.

It will take an act of Congress to adjust the October 12, 1988

deadline, however, and other compliance deadlines to a point where
California's 15,000 schools have a reasonable opportunity to institute a
sound asbestos management program.
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Recommendations
1.

The Office of Local Assistance should field an inspection team to

conduct on-site reviews of inspection reports prepared by EPA-approved
inspectors hired by schools.

Local Assistance inspectors, who should be

industrial hygienists, must be empowered to decertify individuals who
perform improper or incomplete inspections.

This must be urgency

legislation since some inspections will start in early 1988.

These state

inspectors could also provide technical assistance to both public and
private schools; i.e., they could demonstrate what a properly conducted
asbestos inspection should cover.
2.

Local Assistance must have adequate staff to review 15,000

management plans.

A proper staffing level can be set during the 1988-89

budget process
3. All school abatement projects should have an independent project
monitor who reports directly to the school district and who has the power
to shut an abatement job down if safety measures are not followed.

The

monitor cannot have a business relationship with the company hired by the
district to abate an asbestos hazard.

This change in law is needed to

bolster enforcement of asbestos work regulations which are not now
adequately enforced in California.
4.

A school district should be prohibited from using the same company

to assess the condition of asbestos materials and to abate any identifiable
hazards.

Assessment and abatement of asbestos are two distinct functions

which should not be undertaken together by the same company or two
companies with a business relationship.
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5.

The Asbestos Abatement Fund should be restructured so that schools

which would have to be shut down until asbestos materials are abated would
receive priority treatment over schools which use the Fund to help pay for
reconstruction projects.

Furthermore, the use of air monitoring to

establish eligibility for funding should be abolished and instead, Local
Assistance personnel with industrial hygiene capabilities should conduct
on-site assessments to determine eligibility (air monitoring problem
covered in Chapter II).
6.

Local Assistance should report to the Legislature by December 31,

1988, the results of management plans submitted by schools through November
1, 1988.

This report should contain an estimate of how many schools have

complied with the EPA regulation and the projected cost of their long-term
abatement work.

In addition, a report should be done on why some schools

have failed to comply.

Furthermore, the State Auditor General should

complete its audit (P-773) of Local Asssitance's management of asbestos
monies (audit may not be completed until mid-1988) as soon as possible.
7.

The Legislature should provide adequate funding to our schools to

insure that inspections and plans are conducted by qualified personnel in a
timely fashion.

The projected need for public schools is $40 million

during 1988 and $22.8 million in 1989.

Demand for removal funding should

exceed $110 million in 1989.
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FOOTNOTE

Chapter 5

1.

EPA, Guidance for Controlling Asbestos-Containing Materials In
B~fldings, June, 1985.
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CHAPTER VI
STATE OWNED ASBESTOS

"Decisions to abate asbestos are based on potential health risk
considerations--cost is a subordinate factor," so stated Michael J.
Bocchicchio, State Architect of California, at a December 9, 1987 hearing
of the Assembly Housing and Community Development Committee.

Bocchicchio

also testified that long-term costs for abatement in the state's 11,600
buildings could top $1.3 billion while short-term expenditures were set at
$70 million.
The architect's statements drew whistles from members of the audience
who were stunned by the potential bill that taxpayers might have to foot to
control asbestos exposure in state buildings.

Indeed, the state's

involvement in controlling asbestos in its own buildings is one of state
government's best kept secrets.

The Department of General Services, which

oversees the asbestos control program, has developed its initial policies
with limited legislative oversight.

However, the department was most

cooperative with AOR in exchanging information on asbestos control work.
Furthermore, the department participated in two Assembly hearings on
asbestos during December 1987, and, subsequently, altered some of its
asbestos policies as a result of these hearings.

Therefore, the department

has clearly demonstrated a willingness to improve its asbestos control
efforts in concert with legislative oversight.
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This Chapter is devoted to a brief description of the state•s asbestos
control program, including recommendations for improving the program.
law Suit Initiates Action
In January 1985, the State Attorney General, on behalf of the State of
California, joined 41 other states in filing a claim against the Manville
Corporation, a former manufacturer of asbestos which had filed for
protection from creditors under Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy code in
1982.

To date over $80 billion in claims against Manville have been filed

by states, schools, hospitals. etc., hoping to recoup some of the costs
related to abating asbestos hazards in buildings.
State Deputy Attorney General Jeff Graybill explained that the claim
process required the state to present proof of its asbestos inspections and
costs.

Subsequently, under the direction of the Office of the State

Architect (Department of General Services), a series of asbestos
inspections were initiated covering 2,200 buildings during 1985 and 1986.
The remaining 9,000 buildings will be inspected during the coming year.
The Legislature appropriated $2.2 million in the 1986 Budget Act for
the asbestos program.

The initial survey cost $1.2 million.

Remaining

funds coupled with an urgency deficiency appropriation of $627,000 were
used for abatement work.

The 1987 Budget Act added $2 million for

abatement while the Governor has proposed $13.9 million in the 1988-89
budget for future abatement projects at state buildings.

Removal

schedules, however, were put on hold in December 1987, after General
Services learned that not one single asbestos contractor working on state
buildings was legally registered with Cal-OSHA.
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The current budget review

should consider the extent to which the registration oversight will delay
the start and completion of future abatement projects covered in the
proposed budget.
According to Deputy State Architect John W. Hansen (resigned in June,
1987), the initial survey was conducted by six different consultants.
Hansen said the state wanted to spread the work out to assess the
performance of what is a relatively new industry--asbestos hazard

•

assessment.

This survey should not be confused with another state survey,

mandated by legislation (CH. 116, Statutes of 1986), which calls for a
sampling (state and local governments) of public buildings to be surveyed
for asbestos hazards.
Bocchicchio explained that the consultants followed EPA guidelines for
assessing asbestos hazards in buildings.

The focus of the survey was

24-hour facilities such as prisons and hospitals.
11

It should be noted that asbestos is not considered a permanent

construction material and is usually recommended for abatement, 11 sta
Bocchicchio.

"The more durable (nonfriable) materials are recommended for

removal during a future remodel project or renovation of space.

If

asbestos-containing materials are found to be friable, they are removed in
accordance with EPA guidelines."
By using six consultants rather than one or two, the state opened
itself to what critics call the "vagaries of risk assessment 11 •
consultants rate high, some tend to be low.

Some

For example, Asbestos

Environmental Controls, Inc., estimated that each building it checked had
$26,400 worth of priority abatement work while Hall-Kimbrell Environmental
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Services Inc., found an average of $8,932 of abatement work in each
location inspected.

Therefore, while 63 priority hazards were identified

collectively by the six consultants in the survey of 2,200

buildings~

may have been more, or possibly less hazards found if the work had
performed by one or two consultants.
Hansen said he did not check to see if the consultants hired by the
state were connected with companies that remove asbestos.

A business tie

between assessment and a removal company is not illegal nor does it signi
that estimates will be high (promote removal}.

But there has been

substantial documentation to suggest that it would be wise to avoid a
conflict of interest in hazard assessment.

Indeed, at least one of the

state-hired assessment firms was tied to a company which removes asbestos.
Policies Continue to Evolve
On September 8, 1987, the director of General Services, W.J. Anthony,
answered in writing a series of questions that had been lodged by AOR a
month earlier regarding asbestos work in state buildings.

These

answers are followed by updated information when applicable.
(1) Question:

How did you pre-qualify asbestos removal companies that
bid on state jobs? And did you check a contractor for
satisfactory completion of the last three removal jobs?

Answer

Contractors are prequal ified for financial capabil i
where required; otherwise, we rely on the procedures
the Contractors' State License Board, which governs
licensing of contractors and certification of asbestos
abatement firms. OSA (Office of the State Architect)
verifies the status of the licensees prior to issuing a
bid proposal form.
11

"We cannot, under the law, use prior performance as a
screening device, except as it relates to financi
capability and prior safety violations. This office is
preparing a safety questionnaire for review by the
Department of Industrial Relations, per Section 10 1
of the State Contract Act, for future bids.
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"Under the licensing law, the contractor is legally
able to bid on any and all projects provided they can
meet bonding and insurance requirements. We feel that
the assurances provided by bonding, liquidated
and the supervision by the contract consultants (air
monitoring and supervision) are adequate to assure
performance."
Update:

A further clarification of this response verified that
a contractor's previous work was not checked.

As

director Anthony indicated, state law prevents a
contractor from being excluded based soley on prior job
performance.

The point AOR made was that some

contractors do not notify authorities, as requi
law, that they are doing asbestos work, hence, they are
usually not inspected--a record of the work does not
exist.

Specifically, AOR asked Cal-OSHA to check the

reporting records of companies which bid on s
asbestos jobs.

One firm apparently had never

or registered with Cal-OSHA; however, the state did
check the company's last three jobs, hence, it never
was aware that it had not registered
firm also had no recorded asbes

th

violations).

next question addresses General Services'

ilure

communicate with Cal-OSHA on notification
registration records.)

usi

Effective January, 1988 the Start Architect's Office
safety questionnaire in its contract specifications.

The questionnaire,

however, fails to address the asbestos registration requirements of
341.7, Title 8, of the California Administrative Code.
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a

(see

low)

on

Safety Questionnaire

In accordance with Public Contract Code section 10162,
complete the following questionnaire.

bidder sha 11

Has the bidder, any officer of the bidder, or any employee of
bidder who has a proprietary interest in the bidder, ever received a
safety violation citation or failed to file notifications to the
Cal-OSHA, Federal OSHA or EPA agencies for employee records as required
by Title 8, Section 5208, and CFR 40, Part 61?
Yes

---

No

---

If the answer is yes to the above, give the date(s) of the citation(s)
or failure to make notifications and explain the circumstances in an
attachment.
Note:

This questionnaire constitutes a part of the Proposal, and
signature on the signature portion of this Proposal shall
constitute signature on this questionnaire.

(2) Question:
Answer:

Did you verify that the asbestos contractor had
registered with Cal-OSHA as required by law?
"The notification of Cal-OSHA of activities as an
asbestos handler is the contractor's responsibility.
OSA requires that any work done by the contractor on a
"Notification of EPA and local air management dis cts
is the contractor's responsibility. A standard
questionnaire is required from the contractor pursuant
to Section 10162 of the State Contract Act, that it has
not been previously disqualified from participation in
the bidding process due to a citation for violation of
regulations. The questionnaire is made part of the
bidder's proposal form."

Update:

At a December 21, 1987 hearing of the State Assembly
Labor and Employment Committee, Ken McClellan, special
project officer for the Office of the State Architect,
testified that his department had only a "few weeks
ago" learned that not one single contractor removing
asbestos from state buildings was registered with
Cal-OSHA.

At the hearing State Assemblyman Richard E.

Floyd and State Senator Bill Greene recommended that
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all state asbestos jobs be shut down until the
contractors involved were properly registered.
Subsequently, the State Architect sent letters
registered mail (12/24/87), informing contractors doing
asbestos work in state buildings that they must
immediately stop working until they were properly
registered.

The cease and desist order affected six

contractors involved in 33 projects.
General Services should have been aware that contractors had been in
violation of Cal-OSHA's registration law since May 22, 1987.

Also,

Cal-OSHA should have done a better job informing state agencies of the
registration requirements.

Cal-OSHA's first memo on the registration law

was issued August 17, 1987, although General Services administrators and
many asbestos contractors claim they never saw such a memo.
(3)

Question:

Does the state require an asbestos contractor to have
''claims made" or "occurrence" liability insurance?

Update:

Further clarification of the initial response which was
inaccurate revealed that the state requires a $1
million "claims made" coverage, a much less desirable
insurance than "occurrence''.

Basically, under claims

made, the policy only covers claims filed during the
life of the policy, usually one year, while occurrence
claims may be filed at any time.

Only a few abatement

companies have "occurrence'' coverage due to i
cost.
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high

(4)

Question: Does an independent project monitor oversee the
abatement project?
Answer:

"Each project has three 'managers' (the construction
supervisor, consultant and the project manager)
cooperating with each other to provide total project
management. Specifically, within contaminated areas, a
consultant is hired to inspect the contractor's
abatement practices and provide air level monitoring.
During abatement activities, both the consultant and the
contractor report to the OSA construction supervisor.
This dual effort constitutes the total of our field
services. Administrative matters are handled by a
designated project manager in Sacramento.
The consultant is under contract with OSA and is not to
be associated with the contractor in any way. Within the
abatement areas (off-limits to the OSA construction
supervisor), the consultant has delegated authority to
suspend contractor activities. Should an event occur,
immediate notification must be made to the OSA
construction supervisor. The consultant is selected
through OSA's architectural and engineering selection
process.
11

It is our position that the use of qualified
construction supervisors and consultants will result in
adequate supervision of the work and minimize the risk
to building occupants and workers. In addition, we will
be completing a consultant evaluation form which can be
used to improve the services of the consultants. 11
11

(5)

(5)

Question: Are building occupants notified that asbestos removal
work will be performed in the building in which they
work or live?
Answer:

A standardized letter is being prepared as an example
for department notification to building occupants of
impending abatement action. This is an essential step
in the process to allay employee concerns and sti 1 make
them aware of the contract activities."

Update:

As of January 12, 1987, the Department had not

11

a standardized letter; however, it has worked wi
agencies in distributing notification memos to s
employees, according to McClellan.
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Other State Asbestos Policies/Programs
In 1984, the California State University (CSU)with 1,000 buildi

the first

as

public building owner in California to insti

an.

management

te an

Plant operations specialist JoAnn Betti s

all 19 campuses have asbestos and that abatement has or will soon ta

17 campuses.

place
was

She said the original estimate for hazard abatement

at $40 million in 1985, but current estimates have run as hi

$1

llion.

A little over $7 million has been allocated for abatement

sites since
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as

The proposed CSU budget contains $10.6
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"reconstruction task force" to improve mutual understanding of state and
federal laws and regulations involving the handling of hazardous materials
ng recons

on

contracted

While much of this reconstruction work

11

vate vendors, the state has a responsibility

monitor the work to insure it is performed safely.

This monitoring

requires full knowledge of the rules.
Futhermore, the Office of the State Architect should oversee this unit
which could provide valuable technical support to our schools which are now
confronting asbestos management problems.
5.

The Department of General Services' no-asbestos lease policy should

be put into law

should be applied, after review by the State

Legislature, to a 1 s te-owned buildings (General Services controls about
only

all state buildings).
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CHAPTER VII
MARKETPlACE FEARS

"The name of the game in real estate used to be location, location,
location; now it's liability, liability, liability with asbestos at the top
of the list,t stated Jack Townsley, a former EPA asbestos inspector.
1

Richard Klein, senior manager with Kenneth Leventhal & Co., warned, "If
you buy property with asbestos, look out, you're fair game.
asbestos comes in two ways:
regulations exist
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Marketplace fears
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space, a trend initiated by the IBM Corp.

In brief, the selli
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officials wanted to wait for the results of how schools were able
implement the new EPA regulation.
C I

J

this

Environmental Toxicology, State of Kansas, made
ng:

on

increase in controll
and

ir employees

Additional rule-making will prompt an

and unnecessary abatement work by building owners
may exacerbate an already difficult problem. 11

are no quick fixes to solving our state's indoor

Clearly~

asbestos problem.

I

California
11

11

n's comment underscores the urgent need for
states to develop a strong asbestos management

infrastructure 11 , consisting of competent inspectors, planners, monitors,
and waste haulers.

abatement
crafted by techni

We need a reliable game plan

experts to stop the asbestos hysteria in the

marketplace.
comme

al rna

ace

experts

d

owners and inves
-rel

s

good.

expanding taxpayer-supported
While local health officials would

empower their investigations of asbestos

in

really need and want, but will not get due to
cons

Consequently

toring

ipment, training and staff.

network for helping people with asbestos

prob 1ems in
is

service the needs of major building

outlook
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1 ike more s

11 eventually produce a competent, private

rtment buildings is weak.
ce

several cases in the Sacramento area of

homeowners who were living in motels because their homes had been
nated by sl

removal contractors.
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A San Mateo resident

discovered piles of asbestos under her house six months
a contractor to remove the material.

paid

she

A Santa Monica tenant is armed

report indicating that asbestos was spilled in

th a

ildi

A

the installation of fire sprinklers--a clean up order was never iss
San Francisco tenant said asbestos was dropping from her
ceiling.

A city inspector verified the claim and abatement action

occur, but only after five months and dozens

phone

ls

soon
p.

Conclusion
on

Asbestos marketplace fears which lead to buildi
reduced through the institution of asbestos management
However, mandating that building owners employ asbestos

measures

for their properties may backfire due to the inability
insure, at
and/or

is time, that asbes

y

ll

ly.

Recommendation
New state asbestos laws i

i

ild

s

, not

d

burden the existing government network now in
asbestos exposure.

e

For example, to require that

be determined prior to a real estate
hel

1 in that

t would (1)

re

to
2) it would

associated with remodeling; i.e., asbestos removal
a1

new occupants (tenants as wel

as the owners)

n

ilding or house should not be disturbed unless special
taken to control fiber releases.

However, a

counterproductive if it allowed unqualified people
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osure law
ins

areas
ons are

actions that were not indicative of good asbestos management.

A safe

balance must be struck between providing building occupants with
information 11 and instituti

11

Safety

asbestos management programs in our buildings.
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APPENDIX: TABlE I
ACT

The Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (AHERA) applies to all
California public and private schools (K-12) constructed prior to October
12, 1988.
I

ined in EPA regulation 40 CFR, Part

AHERA requirements are

763, which became effective December 14, 1987.

The regulation puts schools on a strict deadline for establishing
ongoing asbestos exposure control programs which may range from periodic
surveillance to complete

asbestos-containing materials.

estimates that the rules will

The EPA

107,000 schools nationwide at a cost

of $3.2 billion over the next 30 years.

Several states contend the EPA has

underestimated compliance costs tenfold.

The Assembly Office of Research

projects that AHERA could cost Cali

a schools $55 million in 1988,

based on all schools comp1

regulation.

however, that the

nanci

rden imposed by AHERA will prohibit at least

30 percent of our schools
year.

School asbestos

But, we believe,

sfying the federal requirements this
itures could top $200 million in 1989 as a

result of the compliance program and the cost of asbestos removal could
easily exceed $1 billion over the next ten years.
of the State Archi
of asbestos abatement in

By comparison the Office

cted in December 1987 that the long-term cost
buil

ngs could run more than $1.3 billion.
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In brief, the EPA regulation requires schools to do the following:
1.

Identify all asbestos materi

s in every school building

nonfriable materials are to be identified as well.

Each

asbestos-containing area is to be assessed for its potential to be a hazard
based on the material•s condition, its accessibility, area use, etc. (see
Chapter III for explanation of factors influencing the release of asbestos
fibers).

The asbestos content of material is to be analyzed by an

EPA-approved laboratory.
years.

This type of inspection is to occur every three

EPA estimates inspections costs per school will range from $1,144

to $1,627.

Inspections may only be conducted by personnel who have passed

an EPA-approved AHERA training course
2.

inspectors.

The inspection results are to be put into a management plan which

would describe how the asbestos
stipulate

ve responses:

encapsulation or removal.
EPA-approved AHERA

mai
The

treated.

The regulations

, repair, enclosure,

anner must have completed an
es mates the cost of developing

ining

management plans per school

11

$1,025 to $1,420.

11

include developing a map of asbestos 1

Other costs

ons ($110 to $270 per school)

and analysis of bulk materials ($500 to $940 per school).
3.

A school's management plan must be submitted to the Governor

1

S

designated AHERA representative, the Office of Local Assistance, by October
12, 1988.

The office has 90 days to review the plans.

If the plan is

rejected, the school in question will have 30 days to revise it.

The

review process will cost Local Assistance at least $1 million, according to
the EPA.
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4.

A school must implement its management plan•s response actions by

July 9, 1989.

The design of a response action and the actual performance

of the action must be carried out by individuals who have completed
EPA-approved AHERA training programs for planners, abatement contractors
and workers.
EPA contends that the response action selected most often will be
operations and maintenance which it estimates will cost a school $3,800 to
$5,100 per year in addition to training costs for employees.

Also, the

rule calls for an initial cleaning of asbestos materials that is expected
to run at least $1,000 per school, not including the purchase of special
cleaning equipment.

Removal costs in California schools are running $10 to

$15 per square-foot.
5.
public.

Each school is to keep management plans available for review by the
Furthermore, each school is to inform parents and employees

annually in writing regarding the presence of asbestos in the school.
6.

The EPA may impose a fine of $5,000 per day on a school which fails

to comply with the regulation.

The fine is raised to $25,000 per day for

violations involving an individual other than a "school district".
Criminal penalties may also be imposed for intentionally or knowingly
falsifying asbestos reports.
7.

Any citizen may file a complaint with the EPA or the Governor if he

or she believes a school is not taking appropriate action to control
asbestos exposure.

Complaints must be responded to within a reasonable

period of time if any investigation reveals that a possible violation of
the federal regulation has occurred.

The Governor has special emergency
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powers which he may use to intercede if he determines that a school is not
implementing its asbestos program in a manner that is protective of public
health.
8.

A school may be exempted, in whole or in part, if it can document

that asbestos materials were previously removed and/or prior inspections
revealed that no asbestos materials were present.

However, the 1982 EPA

regulation directed schools to identify only friable asbestos materials
whereas the new rule directs that all asbestos materials, friable and
nonfriable, be inventoried.
reinspect their buildings.

Therefore, all schools will probably have to
Also, previous inspections may be rejected

because they did not meet EPA standards (evidence of bulk sampling,
participation by a "qualified" inspector, etc. is required).
9.

AHERA is intended to be an ongoing program for schools with

regularly occuring inspections, response actions and training for
employees.
10.

As of January 26, 1988, there were seven "schools" in California

approved to provide EPA training as required by the regulation.

Inspectors

must pass a three-day course; planners must pass the inspection course and
complete two extra days of training; abatement design planners must
complete three days of training.

Abatement contractors and supervisors

must complete four days of training while abatement workers must pass a
three-day training course.

Program Cost Projections
Local Assistance informed AOR that there are approximately 7,500 public
schools and 7,500 private schools.

The Department of Education's 1986
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figures total 12,819 schools (4,533 public elementary, 2,829 public
secondary and 5,457 private).
schools affected by AHERA.
compliance costs.

The EPA estimates that California has 10,932

We used Education statistics to project

In addition, we assumed that only 70 percent of the

schools will be able to comply with AHERA during the first year.

Reasons

for noncompliance center on lack of funds to pay for asbestos-related work
and delays in contracting with EPA-accredited inspectors and planners .

•

We also inflated EPA's cost estimates by as much as 50 percent to
account for the fact that the cost of abatement work in California is
higher than in most other states.

1988 inspections/management plans (70% compliance)
Public Schools

$ 25.7 million

Private Schools

$ 16. 6 million

TOTAL

$ 42.2 million

1989 inspections/management plans/response
actions other than removal

1989 removal

Public Schools

$ 37.1 million

$ 110 mill ion

Private Schools

$ 10.2 million

$ 45 million

TOTAL

$ 47.3 million

$ 155 mi 11 ion
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